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Hegel’s Theory of Imagination. By jennifer ann 
bates. State University of New York Press. 
2004. pp. xlv + 202. $50.
In this book, Jennifer Ann Bates engages in a 
very detailed and well-supported exegesis of 
Hegel’s various discussions of the  imagination. 
Although many of his comments on the 
 subject have already been extensively  analysed, 
Bates’s book promises to be the ﬁ rst 
 monograph to concentrate exclusively on 
Hegel’s theory of the imagination and to 
bring  together, in a unifying and challenging 
interpretation, most of Hegel’s writings on 
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the subject. Because of this, and because of 
the book’s scholarly quality, it is indispensable 
reading for anyone interested in Hegel’s ac-
count of the role of the imagination in our 
mental, communicative, and creative lives. In 
addition, the book is also very informative 
about the general development of Hegel’s 
philosophy, as well as its similarities to and 
differences from the theories of his predeces-
sors, notably Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Its 
direct relevance for aesthetics is, however, 
limited by the fact that, apart from rendering 
Hegel’s elucidation of the differences between 
his own and the German Romantics’ views 
on irony and genius, Bates provides only a 
brief summary of some of the main aspects of 
Hegel’s (and Kant’s) aesthetic theories.
As the primary aim of her book, Bates identi-
ﬁ es the defence of the claim that the imagina-
tion is ‘the key player in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit’ (p. xviii), despite the fact that Hegel does 
not (with one exception) mention it in his work. 
The ﬁ rst two parts of Bates’s book (consisting, 
respectively, of ﬁ ve chapters, and of one  chapter) 
are reserved for the exposition and interpreta-
tion of Hegel’s comments on the imagination in 
texts other than the Phenomenology, while the 
third and ﬁ nal part addresses the issue of the role 
of the imagination in the Phenomenology.
Bates uses the ﬁ rst part of the book to 
 provide a detailed outline of the development 
of Hegel’s views, from his early writings via 
the Geistesphilosophie lectures to the Encyclo-
paedia, on the role of the imagination in the 
mental life of individual subjects. Her main 
conclusion is that Hegel comes to identify the 
imagination with the conscious activity 
 inherent in the dialectical steps (and, in 
 particular, their negative moments), which 
constitute the progressive development of 
thought from unconsciousness via  object-
consciousness towards self-consciousness as 
rational (or absolute). The different imagina-
tive activities in play at the various stages of 
this process correspond thereby to different 
moments or forms of the imagination.
In the second part, Bates presents Hegel’s 
thoughts, in his Lectures on Aesthetics, on the 
role of the imagination in interpersonal life 
and, notably, in the creation of artworks. This 
is meant to clarify further Hegel’s theory of 
the imagination, as well as the context of the 
only mention of the imagination in the 
 Phenomenology, namely Hegel’s criticism of 
the German Romanticist conception of 
 genius. Bates elucidates how Hegel conceives 
of artistic creation as an imaginative activity 
that tries to balance the artist’s deep and 
 emotional subjective reﬂ ection on man’s 
 inner life with the historically developed 
means and requirements of an  intersubjectively 
understandable expression in concrete works 
of art. If successful, the artist will articulate in 
his art the spirit of his time; and the resulting 
history of artworks will reﬂ ect the progressive 
development of the society’s thinking towards 
the attainment of self-consciousness.
The third and last part of Bates’s book is 
concerned with the defence of her main thesis 
about Hegel’s imagination. According to 
Bates, the primary purpose of the Phenomenol-
ogy is to invite the reader to pursue for himself 
the  dialectical development of thinking. This 
means, in the light of Bates’s previous inter-
pretations of Hegel’s other works, that the 
reader is meant to make use of his imagination 
in order to ascend dialectically towards an 
awareness of the rational nature of thinking 
and, in particular, of the imaginative activity 
essential to it. The imagination is thus implic-
itly the ‘key player’ in the Phenomenology 
 because it enables the reader to ‘think through 
to its end’ the development of spirit (p. xviii). 
But, as Bates suggests, it is not explicitly 
 discussed in Hegel’s text because the imagina-
tion is—in contrast to, say, sensation, percep-
tion, or understanding—not itself a step in that 
dialect ical progress towards self-consciousness.
Bates’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of 
mind is generally fascinating and original. How-
ever, an important problem with her conclu-
sion is that, if the imagination is really the ‘key 
player’ in the dialectical progress towards  self-
consciousness, the question of why Hegel does 
not at all state or discuss this fact in the Phenom-
enology or any of his other writings remains 
 unanswered. As Bates shows, a lengthy exegesis 
of Hegel’s texts is necessary to  recognize fully 
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the signiﬁ cance of the imagination for his 
 epistemology. But this seems, somewhat im-
plausibly, to suggest that Hegel himself was not 
absolutely clear about the epistemological role 
of the imagination implied by his own theory 
of the relation between mind and world.
Another potential weakness is that Bates does 
not try to order and connect systematically the 
many different activities and roles of the 
 imagina tion that Hegel has described in his var-
ious writings. For instance, the three moments 
of the imagination introduced in the Encyclopae-
dia (that is, the reproductive, the symbolic, and 
the naming imagination) seem to mirror closely 
three of the four activities assigned to the 
 imagination in the Geistesphilosophie lectures of 
1805–1806 (the fourth activity is the fixation of 
images in the unconscious mind). But Bates 
does not really clarify the general similarities and 
differences among these and the other imaginat-
ive activities postulated by Hegel, nor all of the 
subtle shifts in his different descriptions of them. 
Even if it is granted that our thinking develops 
in dialect ical steps, Bates does not succeed in 
showing that the activity involved in this 
 progress is indeed of the same kind as, say, the 
activity involved in visualizing, supposing or 
otherwise imagining something, or as the activ-
ity involved in creating artworks.
This lack of (interest in) systematization is 
perhaps related to the fact that Bates does not 
clearly draw or specify several important 
 distinctions essential to the full  characterization 
of imaginative activity: that between activity 
and passivity; various kinds of activity (that is, 
spontaneity, voluntariness, deliberateness, or 
artistic creativity); imaginative representations 
and imaginative abilities; and between the 
general ability to form mental representations 
and the special ability to be creative in thought 
or expression. As a result, it ultimately  remains 
unresolved, for instance, in which sense Hegel 
(or indeed Bates) takes recollection to be both 
‘reproduct ive’ and ‘creative’, or the activities 
of forming mental images and of creating 
 artworks, to pertain to the same fundamental 
activity or  faculty.
What all these points may be understood to 
reveal is that Hegel and the German Idealists 
 appear to be interested in a rather different 
kind of ‘imagination’ than many other philoso-
phers, such as Hume, Wittgenstein, or Sartre. 
While the former have focused on a certain 
(transcendental) activity necessary for  cognition, 
the latter have targeted a certain  (psychological) 
activity essential to the formation of imagina-
tive  representations (for example, visualizings 
or  supposings). Furthermore, many of the  latter 
take these imaginative representations—in 
contrast, say, to perceptions, memories, or 
 beliefs—to be uninformative about the world 
and hence to lack any function in cognition. 
And this suggests a  possible alternative explana-
tion of why the imagination is not dealt with in 
the Phenomenology. Since Hegel’s work is 
 primarily concerned with the deﬁ ciencies of 
speciﬁ c cognitive representations (such as sensa-
tion, perception, or understanding) and how 
these deﬁ ciencies may be overcome by means 
of a dialectical progress towards absolute know-
ing, it is perhaps not surprising that the  non-
cognitive imaginings do not ﬁ gure in his text.
That Bates assumes an epistemological role 
for the imagination without much argument 
seems intimately linked to the fact that she 
remains ﬁ rmly within the Hegelian cosmos. 
Her discussion of Hegel is not very critical, at 
least not when concerned with his later, most 
developed views; and Bates frequently adopts 
a language highly reminiscent of the philoso-
pher’s own. It would, however, have been 
helpful—in particular for readers not well 
 acquainted with Hegel—if she had translated 
more of his ideas into a less metaphorical 
 terminology, and made more use of examples 
to illustrate them.  Nevertheless, Bates  succeeds 
impressively in elucidating the major aspects 
of Hegel’s thoughts on the imagina tion and of 
his dialectical approach to the acquisition of 
knowledge and the constitution of the self. 
And her book should deﬁ nitely be among the 
ﬁ rst choices for anyone intending to study 
Hegel’s theory of imagination.
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